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A B S T R A C T
The lack of land ownership can discourage agricultural technology adoption, yet there is scarce evidence of the
impact of land rental contracts on the adoption of improved crop varieties in developing countries. The current
study investigates such impact using a nationally representative survey of Ethiopian maize farmers. In contrast to
many previous studies, we show in a simple model that cash-renters are as likely to adopt improved maize
varieties as owner-operators, while sharecroppers are more likely to adopt given that such varieties are prof-
itable. Empirical analysis reveals a significant impact of sharecropping on improved maize variety adoption, and
no significant impact from cash-rental, lending support to the above hypotheses. These results imply that im-
provements in land rental markets can potentially enhance household welfare through crop variety adoption in
agrarian economies where land sales markets are incomplete or missing.
1. Introduction
Land ownership, or land tenure, has been increasingly investigated
as a factor affecting modern agricultural technology adoption in Sub-
Sahara Africa (SSA). From both theoretical and empirical perspectives,
Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) find secure tenure encourages invest-
ments in soil conservation technologies in northern Ethiopia. Abdulai
et al. (2011) conclude that land ownership tends to facilitate invest-
ment in soil-improving and natural resource management practices in
Ghana. Oostendorp and Zaal (2012) also suggest that transfer rights, a
measure of land ownership, stimulate the adoption of soil and water
conservation technologies in Kenya. It is generally hypothesized that
land ownership encourages agricultural technology adoption, while the
lack of land ownership discourages it. The underlying argument is that
the lack of landownership, as usually reflected in land rentals, may
preclude tenants from future technology-induced benefits due to the
risk of eviction. Land ownership, on the contrary, can safeguard cash
flows over time and facilitate asset liquidation given transferrable land
rights and can also enhance access to resources such as credit (Feder
and Nishio, 1998). All these factors can incentivize the adoption of
technologies that require investments and that potentially increase the
value of land.
Empirical findings of this literature, however, are mixed the hy-
pothesized impacts can sometimes bear opposite signs and their mag-
nitudes are usually small (see Brasselle et al., 2002; Place, 2009;
Fenske, 2011 for literature syntheses from different perspectives). Such
inconclusiveness is partly due to the failures to differentiate the varying
characteristics of agricultural technologies. For example, Deininger and
Jin (2006) show that the lack of land ownership, or tenure insecurity,
can either discourage agricultural technology investment (if ownership
security is exogenous) or encourage investment (if ownership security is
endogenous). The latter observation accords with earlier literature that
the threat of non-renewal may cause tenants to work harder and pro-
duce more (Cheung, 1969). Place (2009) further shows that the di-
vergent impacts of land ownership on the adoption of different tech-
nologies in a comprehensive literature review. Hence, characteristics of
agricultural technologies need careful differentiation to help disen-
tangle any confounding impacts in search of policy implications.
While most studies in this literature focus on resource-conserving
technologies, modern agricultural technologies also include pro-
ductivity-enhancing ones such as improved crop varieties and fertilizer
(Ersado et al., 2004), and possible impacts of land ownership on the
latter need to be better understood. This literature bias could be partly
driven by the belief that land ownership affects only long-term
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investments related to natural resource management but not short-term
input use decisions. However, this is not generally true because even
seasonal crop variety choices may have deferred impacts on pro-
ductivity or risk-mitigation that could affect investments, which in turn
depends on land ownership. Although a few recent studies have ana-
lyzed the impact of land ownership on the adoption of fertilizer (e.g.
Abdulai et al., 2011; Ali et al., 2012), these studies fail to consider crop
variety choices which potentially affect fertilizer application decisions
(Heisey and Norton, 2007). Despite land market imperfections, im-
proved crop varieties have been a major driver of agricultural pro-
ductivity growth in SSA (see Evenson and Gollin, 2003 for a compre-
hensive cross-country analysis), which further results in welfare
improvements in terms of poverty reduction (Kassie et al., 2011; Zeng
et al., 2015), and food security (Shiferaw et al., 2014). Understanding
how land ownership affects improved crop variety adoption is therefore
highly relevant in assisting ongoing market-oriented land reforms in
SSA.
Empirical identification of the hypothesized impact is difficult due
to confounding effects. For instance, resource-conserving practices such
as tree planting can be adopted to demonstrate and strengthen claims to
land rights (Place and Otsuka, 2002), while productivity-enhancing
practices such as organic fertilizer that improves soil capital can also be
adopted by tenants to increase the chance to continue land operation in
the future (Abdulai et al., 2011). In both cases, causality can be reverse,
but such potential endogeneity is not commonly recognized (Brasselle
et al., 2002; Fenske, 2011). Moreover, although the lack of land own-
ership is mainly manifested through land rental contracts,1 few studies
differentiate contract types such as cash-rental or sharecropping due to
data limitations. These complexities need to be clearly understood by
policy makers who hope to improve rural welfare from this perspective.
The current study assesses the impacts of land rental, as associated
with two most important land rental contracts (cash rental and share-
cropping), on improved crop variety adoption using a nationally re-
presentative survey of maize farmers in Ethiopia. We show in a simple
model that, unlike the case of resource-conserving technologies, land
rental does not discourage the adoption of improved crop varieties for
cash-renters, but encourages adoption for sharecroppers if such vari-
eties are profitable. Empirical evidence is robust in support of these
hypotheses, suggesting that improvements in land rental markets can
potentially enhance household welfare in agrarian economies where
land sales markets are incomplete or missing.
2. Land ownership and maize production in Ethiopia
Land tenancy in Ethiopia has a long history, which stems from the
feudal system that existed before the Derg government took power in
1974. Land distribution was skewed and a large share of land was op-
erated by tenants. Early literature shows that the share of rented land
was over 40 percent, and operating tenants represented a similar pro-
portion of the total population (Rahmato, 1984). Sharecropping was the
dominant type of land rental (Holden et al., 2008).
Land rental has been present in Ethiopia throughout history.
Arbitrary eviction of tenants was a major feature of the land rental
system in the feudal society (Deininger and Jin, 2006). The land reform
in 1975 confiscated all land as state property, and cultivators were left
with only user rights but prohibited from land rentals and labor hiring
(Holden et al., 2008). Further, land redistribution through govern-
mental power was common during the Derg regime under the stated
objectives of overcoming inequality and landlessness (Fenske, 2011).
Since the current government took power in 1991, land redistributions
were largely reduced (with the exception of land redistribution in
Amhara region in 1997–1998) and short-term land renting and labor
hiring were legalized. However, as permanent land transfer continues
to be prohibited by enforced policies, the land sales market is still
nonexistent in rural Ethiopia. Land inheritance is allowed and creates
incentives for land rentals (Crewett and Korf, 2008). As a result, the
short-term land rental market is expanding, and plot rentals are
common due to land fragmentation (Benin et al., 2005). The scenario of
Ethiopia therefore provides a unique context of study as the land rental
market plays an active role to meet the expanding land demand without
land sales market, and possible policy implications of the current study
may also apply to other agrarian economies in SSA where land sales
markets are underdeveloped and land rental widely exists.
Maize is one of the most important food and cash crops in SSA. In
Ethiopia, maize accounts for the largest share of production by volume
and is produced by more farmers than any other crop (Chamberlin and
Schmidt, 2012). During the 2009–2010 production year, Ethiopia
produced 3.89 million tons of maize on 1.77 million hectares of land
(Central Statistical Agency, 2010). The average productivity of 2.20
tons per hectare was the highest among all cereal crops in the country.
In the last four decades, more than 40 improved maize varieties
have been developed through joint efforts of the Ethiopian Institute of
Agricultural Research and the International Maize and Wheat
Improvement Center (CIMMYT). Improved maize seeds have been dif-
fused mainly through the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise, the major seed
producer and distributor, while regional seed enterprises such as
Oromia Seed Enterprise, Amhara Seed Enterprise, and Southern Seed
Enterprise also produce and sell maize seeds. Improved varieties are a
major contributor of maize productivity growth. Recent literature as-
sociates the adoption of improved maize varieties in Ethiopia to a
47.6%–63.3% yield increase and consequently a 0.8–1.3 percentage
reduction of poverty headcount ratio (Zeng et al., 2015).
Improved maize varieties can be categorized as either hybrid or
open-pollinated improved varieties (OPVs). Hybrids have the highest
yield, but are more costly to adopt as the restoration of hybrid vigor
requires purchasing new seeds in each cropping season. The yields of
OPVs are generally lower than those of hybrids (though still much
higher than those of local varieties), but OPV seeds cost less than those
of hybrids and may be recycled for up to three cropping seasons without
significant yield loss. Many OPVs have specific traits which make their
yields robust against challenging conditions such droughts and pests.
Seed recyclability also makes them especially attractive for areas with
underdeveloped seed markets (Jaleta et al., 2013).
Adoption of improved maize varieties varies across agro-ecological
regions throughout Ethiopia (Jaleta et al., 2013). Our data suggest that
adoption rates as measured by area are higher in places of higher maize
potential. No single variety dominates the whole adoption scenario, but
hybrids are more popular than OPVs in general.
3. Theoretical framework
To illustrate the potential relationship between land rental contracts
and the adoption of improved crop varieties, we build a simple theo-
retical model below. Our model is comparable to the mainstream lit-
erature that links land ownership and agricultural technology adoption
(e.g. Deininger and Jin, 2006), but extends it to differentiate cash-rental
and sharecropping contracts and to capture the specific characteristics
of productivity-enhancing technologies. In this model, each farmer i is
categorized as an owner-operator (O), a cash-renter (H ), or a share-
cropper (S). Regardless of land ownership, farmer i maximizes the
present value (PVi) of current cropping returns (R )i , net of total costs
(Ci), plus the expected future net returns, Vi , consisting of all future
revenues assumed to be realized in the second period and possibly
downscaled by a tenure risk indicator, θi ( ≤ ≤θ0 i 1), due to the risk of
losing land use rights (with rdenoting the discount factor):
= − +
+
PV R C θ V
r
max
1i i i i
i
(1)
1 Land rental contracts can be either written or oral, and it is often the latter in rural
Ethiopia (Holden et al., 2008).
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The total cost, Ci, captures both production/technology inputs, Ii,
and possible land cost, Li, i.e. = +C I Li i i. Ri and Ci can be functions of
household characteristics, plot characteristics, and crop variety adop-
tion decision. For illustrative purposes, we consider the adoption de-
cision, Ai, as a continuous argument of both Ri and Ci. Ai also reason-
ably captures the effort level of farmer i in face of extra investment
reflected in Ci. In reality, it can be either the acreage of improved crop
varieties (measured in hectares) or the area share of improved crop
varieties among the whole cultivated area (measured as a ratio between
zero and one). Assume that both Ri and Ci are fully differentiable with
respect to Ai and satisfy standard properties that suggest the existence
of a unique optimum.2 On the other hand, unlike other agricultural
technologies that affect long-term productivity, Vi is not likely to be
affected by season-specific crop variety choices.3 For this reason, Vi is
assumed not to vary among farmer types, and so = = =V V V VO H S . Eq.
(1) can therefore be written as:
= − − +
+
PV R A I A L A θ V
r
max ( ) ( ) ( )
1i i i i i i i i (2)
Eq. (2) describes the problem for all types of land ownership con-
sidered in the analysis: owner-operator (O), cash-renter (H ), or share-
cropper (S). For the owner-operator, =L 0O as he/she does not pay for
the owned land, and =θ 1i as there is no risk of eviction from the op-
erated land. The optimal adoption level (AO* ) is derived according to the
following first-order condition:
∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ =A R A I A( / / ) 0O O O O O (3)
Eq. (3) satisfies complementary slackness: either >A 0O and
∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ =R A C A/ / 0O O O O , or =A 0O and ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ <R A C A/ / 0O O O O .4
The case of the cash-renter is different as the land cost is no longer
zero, i.e. >L 0H . However, since the land rent is fixed, it does not vary
with the tenant’s adoption behavior, i.e. ∂ ∂ =L A/ 0H H . The tenure risk
indicator, θH , can take any value between zero and one, yet it is not
likely affected by varietal adoption either since the rent is pre-
determined free of crop variety choices.5 Moreover, the expected future
net returns are again not affected by adoption for reasons above.
Therefore, the first-order condition for the cash-renter can be expressed
using similar notation as:
∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ =R A I A/ / 0H H H H (4)
Therefore, the first-order condition for the cash-renter as well as the
optimal level of adoption is exactly the same as that for the owner-
operator. This leads to our first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Land rental does not affect the adoption decisions of cash-
renters, who are as likely to adopt improved crop varieties as owner-operators.
This result is intuitive because crop revenues are received after each
cropping season, and therefore the cash-renter adopts improved crop
varieties as long as they are profitable in the current period. The risk of
eviction in the future simply does not play a role as it is not changeable
by current adoption, though it can increase current and thus the total
discounted profit over time, PVH . This result differs from that for other
agricultural technologies such as conservation strategies which produce
future benefits. In the latter cases, land rental can preclude tenants from
future technology-induced benefits through eviction and may dis-
courage adoption (Soule et al., 2000).
The case of the sharecropper is more complicated than that of the
cash-renter for two reasons. First, unlike either owner-operators or
cash-renters who receive all revenues and bear all costs, a sharecropper
assumes only a share of each and the shares can differ. Instead of paying
a separate land rent, the sharecropper forgoes a proportion of the
cropping revenue in exchange of land use rights. Second, although fu-
ture revenues (V ) are not likely altered by crop varieties adopted in the
current period, the chance of continuing cultivation on the plot, again
captured by the tenure risk indicator, can indeed be affected as a profit-
driven landlord may choose to continue contracting with a share-
cropper who generates higher returns for him/her through the adoption
of improved crop varieties. Given these differences, we can write the
sharecropper’s problem as:
= − + − ∙
+
PV αR A βI A θ α R A V
r
max ( ) ( ) [(1 ) ( )]
1S S S S S S S S (5)
where α is the revenue share ( < <α0 1); β is the cost share ( < <β0 1); θS
is the tenure risk indicator ( ≤ ≤θ0 S 1 due to the risk of eviction); and
≠α β in general. The third term is the tenure-risk weighted, discounted
expected future net returns received by the sharecropper. In this case,
the land cost of the sharecropper is computed as the difference between
the forgone revenue and the compensated input cost (shared by the
landlord), i.e. − − −α R A β I(1 ) ( ) (1 )S S S, and therefore Eq. (5) describes a
specific scenario derived from Eq. (2). Unlike the cash-renter case, θS is
now affected by the landlord’s share of cropping revenue, −α R(1 ) S,
where the total revenue (RS) is further affected by the sharecropper’s


































Eq. (5) intuitively suggests the equimarginal principle: at the op-
timum, the marginal benefit of improved crop variety adoption, in-
cluding current marginal revenue plus future marginal revenue due to
increased chance to cultivate the same land in the future, is equal to the
marginal cost of adoption the sharecropper bears in the current period.
To derive the comparative statics of interest, i.e. the impact of
sharecropping contract on improved crop variety adoption, ∂ ∂A θ/S S,
we formally assume ∂ ∂ ≥θ R/ 0S S . It is intuitive that higher revenue in
most cases may financially incentivize a landlord to continue the con-
tract with a sharecropper. In the first (and rare) case where the landlord
is profit-neutral and an interior solution exists, i.e. ∂ ∂ =θ R/ 0S S , Eq. (5)
reduces to:
∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ =α R A β I A( / ) ( / ) 0S S S S (7)
Under the equal share rule that =α β, it is straightforward to see
that the first-order condition and optimal level of adoption for the
sharecropper is exactly the same as that for the owner-operator, as
shown in Eq. (2). In the real world, however, departures from the equal
share rule are also observed, where issues such as output uncertainty
and input monitoring difficulty may result in contracts where ≠α β
(Braverman and Stiglitz, 1986). In these cases, a sharecropper can be
either more or less likely to adopt improved crop varieties, but all these
cases would be trivial in the real world as most landlords are profit-
driven (∂ ∂ >θ R/ 0S S , the conventional rationality assumption).
As it is assumed in footnote3 that ∂ ∂ >R A/ 0S S , ∂ ∂ >θ R/ 0S S further
implies that the last term of Eq. (5) is positive while the sum of first two
2 For the rest of the analysis, it is only necessary to explicitly assume that ∂ ∂ >R A/ 0i i ,
i.e. adoption of improved crop varieties increases revenue with higher yields. It is trivially
satisfied for most improved crop varieties.
3 This argument could be challenged if improved maize varieties are adopted with
other technologies, particularly fertilizer as the residual of fertilizer might go to the next
season. In our survey, fertilizer application is very common (utilized by more than 90% of
surveyed farmers), and so its association with improved maize variety adoption is not
strong. Including fertilizer use is therefore less informative given its limited variation and
is problematic due to endogeneity and associated bias. Therefore, we choose to exclude
fertilizer use in our empirical modeling.
4 For the rest of the analysis, we shall focus on interior solutions to derive comparative
statics. Obviously, some operators would not adopt improved crop varieties for a number
of reasons regardless of the tenure type (owner-operator, cash-renter and sharecropper),
yet identification of those constraints are beyond the scope of the current study.
Therefore, it is of our primary interest to see how tenure arrangements would affect the
level of improved variety adoption which, for illustrative purposes, could be better cap-
tured by comparative statics assuming an interior solution.
5 It could be argued that the profitability and increasing adoption of improved maize
varieties might increase cash rents over time. If that is the case, a positive correlation
would be expected between cash-rental and maize variety adoption. Empirical in-
vestigation of this, however, would require multiple rounds of observations and is not
supported by our data. Nevertheless, the current approach does not lose generality in the
short-term investigation of the hypothesized impacts.
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terms is negative regardless of the values α and β take. With implicit











r α R A β I A
(1 )
(1 )[ ( / ) ( / )]
0S
S S S S S (8)
Hypothesis 2. Sharecroppers are more likely to adopt improved crop
varieties than owner-operators given that these varieties are profitable and
the landlord is profit-driven.
This result is again intuitive: as long as improved crop varieties are
profitable, a sharecropper will try to secure future profit flows through
extension of the land rental contract by adopting improved crop vari-
eties. As most landlords are profit-driven, and given the fact that
sharecropping has been the predominant land rental contract type in
Ethiopia (Holden et al., 2008), we further expect a positive overall
impact of land rental on the adoption of improved crop varieties. Such
overall impact is also evaluated in our empirical analysis after the as-
sessment of contract-specific impacts of cash-rental and sharecropping.
4. Data description
The current analysis uses data from a household survey of Ethiopian
maize farmers conducted during 2009–2010. Four regions were cov-
ered: Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and
People's Region (SNNPR), which together accounted for more than 93%
of maize production in Ethiopia (Schneider and Anderson, 2010). The
data were collected using a stratified random sampling strategy that
appropriately accounted for the representativeness of areas with
varying maize potential, and therefore are nationally representative for
the maize growing areas.
The survey covered 1396 farm households from 124 villages (ke-
beles) in 30 districts (woredas) across the four regions, of whom 1359
households grew maize on 2496 plots during the surveyed period. Basic
demographics, including characteristics of the household head, were
reported at the household level. Total land and asset holdings, and
infrastructure conditions such as distances (measured in walking min-
utes) to the nearest agricultural extension office (where most Ethiopian
farmers buy improved crop seeds and meet extension personnel) and
main market, were also reported at this level. Detailed maize cropping
practices and physical conditions such as fertility, soil depth and slope
were assessed by farmers at the plot level.
Land use rights (ownership), crop choice and technology adoption
were reported at the plot level. Maize plots are classified as either “owned”
or “rented in” (through either cash rental or sharecropping contracts).
Further classification of the two types of land rental contracts, either cash-
rental or sharecropping, is facilitated using the information of in-kind
payments to land recorded in the crop utilization section of the survey.
After intensive discussions with local experts, sharecropped plots are
identified as those of positive in-kind payments to land of maize and cash-
rented plots are those of zero in-kind payments to land. In our survey, crop
utilization is recorded as crop- and season-specific rather than plot-spe-
cific, and differentiation of cash-rental and sharecropping would have
been impossible if a household operated more than one rented plot.
Fortunately, 46.4% of households operated only a single maize plot in the
surveyed period and 85.53% of households who cultivated multiple maize
plots owned all these plots. To help identify sharecropped plots, the
magnitudes of in-kind payments are further checked with total plot-level
maize outputs, and a few observations where in-kind payments exceed
total output are identified as misreported and dropped. Finally, house-
holds with either unidentifiable contract types or missing values are
dropped, and 2359 maize plots operated by 1300 households remain in
our empirical analysis with all necessary information. To minimize con-
cerns about sample selectivity, we further check if the characteristics of the
excluded and included households and the plots they operated are similar,
and find that they are.
Maize variety information was also reported at the plot level. Exact
variety names recorded in the survey were classified as hybrid, OPV or
local after detailed communication with breeding scientists in Ethiopia.
Although both hybrids and OPVs are widely adopted, few plants are
genetically pure in maize cropping practices as inbred lines are usually
crossed through open pollination. Also, yields of hybrids (3,543 kilo-
grams per hectare) and OPVs (3,068 kilograms per hectare) are similar
in our data (with no statistical significance at 5% level through pairwise
t-test). Therefore, varieties are only categorized as either improved
(including both hybrids and OPVs) or local in our analysis. As suggested
by local breeding scientists, any hybrid variety ever recycled or an OPV
recycled for more than three seasons are categorized as local due to
substantial productivity loss. Finally, the maize variety was unique for
any plot in our data, and each plot is finally identified as having either
an improved or a local maize variety.
Based on the binary categorization of maize varieties, our survey
presents 541 non-adopters (who did not adopt any improved maize
variety), 486 full adopters (who purely grew improved maize varieties)
and 273 partial adopters (who grew both improved and local varieties
on different plots). Household characteristics are reported in Table 1.
Larger, wealthier land holders and those with more family members are
more likely to adopt improved maize varieties. Adopting households,
including both full and partial adopters, differ systematically from non-
adopting households in that the latter are poorer and are more likely
female-headed ones. Non-adopters also have smaller land holdings, live
farther from main markets, and observe lower maize yields. Moreover,
non-adopters are less likely to participate in land rental markets,
through either cash-rental or sharecropping.
Partial adoption of improved crop varieties widely exists in the
developing world (e.g. Smale et al., 1994; Radhu et al., 2015; Kathage
et al., 2016). In our data, partial adopters have the largest total land-
holding, wealth and total maize area with market access better than
non-adopters but worse than full adopters (Table 1). The pattern that
larger farms tend to be partial adopters is also observed in Radhu et al.
(2015). While identification of the determinants of partial adoption is
beyond the scope of the current study and is difficult with our cross-
sectional observational data, literature generally suggests risk-averse
farmers would partially adopt to reduce perceived downside production
risk of improved varieties (Smale et al., 1994; Krishna et al., 2016),
especially in the absence of formal insurance markets (Baumgärtner
and Quaas, 2010). Therefore, it is primarily the intermediate small-
holders that are fully incentivized to intensify crop production through
full adoption of improved maize varieties (Radhu et al., 2015).
Among the 2359 maize plots operated by these 1300 households,
1965 were operated by owners, 89 by cash-renters and 305 by share-
croppers. Plot characteristics are reported in Table 2. Rented-in plots
are farther from operators’ homes and sharecropped plots are generally
larger and more fertile. Adoption rates are higher on rented plots.
Sharecropped plots have slightly higher maize yields than owner-op-
erated ones, yet such difference is only marginally significant and could
largely result from the higher adoption rate of improved maize varieties
with sharecropping. Finally, although “reverse tenancy” is common in
Ethiopia (resource-poor landlords rent out land to resource-rich tenants
in change of fixed income to hedge against production risks, ses Ghebru
and Holden, 2008; Holden and Bezabih, 2008), our data show no evi-
dence for either land holding or wealth differentials by land ownership.
5. Empirical strategy
Our empirical analysis is implemented in three steps. First, we
consider the contract-specific impacts of land rental on improved maize
variety adoption and estimate separate impacts of cash-rental and
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sharecropping (“contract model” hereafter). To see possible overall
impact regardless of contract types, we further apply a similar proce-
dure using a binary land rental indicator without differentiation of
contract type (“tenure model” hereafter). Multiple robustness exercises
are finally performed to build confidence in the findings.
Empirical modeling is implemented at the plot level, as a farmer
could operate both owned and rented-in plots at the same time. As
discussed in our theoretical model above, for plot j of farmer i, both
crop revenue (Rij) and cost (Cij) are assumed to be functions of house-
hold characteristics, Hi, plot characteristics, Pij, adoption decision, Aij,
and unobservables, εij. Use Tij to denote land tenure. Our empirical
model with adoption as the dependent variable can be conceptually
specified by solving the optimization problem for plot j of farmer i:
= H P TA A ε( , , , )i ij ijij ij ij (9)
where εij is the random disturbance that comes into play in the re-
gression model. Specifically, the vector Hi includes household size,
total household wealth, total land holding the age, gender, marital
status and education of the household head, the walking distances to
the nearest main market and agricultural extension office, two social
network indicators (number of years living in the village and farmers’
cooperative membership indicator) and a binary indicator suggesting if
household i had unmet credit need in crop production during the sur-
veyed year.6 The vector Pij includes plot size, soil fertility, soil slope,
soil depth, distance from home and the cropping season. Although Tij is
also a plot feature, we further set it apart from other plot characteristics
as it is of our main interest. In the contract model, Tij is a vector of two
binary indicators (of cash-rental and sharecropping) which take the
value of one for rented plots and zero for owned plots. While in the
tenure model, Tij is one binary indicator of land rental. Tijis treated as
endogenous given its choice nature as reflected by possible correlations
with unobservables (εij).
Econometric approaches to binary choice models with endogenous
regressors include linear probability model with instrumental variable
estimation, multivariate probit model with maximum likelihood esti-
mation and control function probit model with two-stage estimation.
Estimation of a linear probability model by two-stage least squares
(2SLS) is suitable in our case as the causal impact of land rental on
Table 1
Household Summary Statistics by Adoption Type.a
Non-adoptersb (n= 541) Full adoptersb (n=486) Partial adoptersb (n= 273)
Household size 6.26 (2.22) 6.53 (2.42) 6.91 (2.40)**, †
Total assets (ETB)c 13,474 (30,511) 18,982 (35,721)** 22,819 (61,171)**
Head age (years) 43.66 (12.61) 41.86 (13.00)* 43.30 (11.40)
Head gender (male=1; female= 0) 0.92 (0.27) 0.95 (0.21)* 0.98 (0.15)**, †
Head marital status (married=1; other= 0) 0.91 (0.29) 0.95 (0.22)* 0.96 (0.19)**
Head education (years) 2.54 (3.03) 2.94 (3.36)* 2.97 (3.13)
Main market distance (walking minutes) 114.5 (59.97) 83.60 (54.11)** 97.20 (60.52)**, ††
Extension office distance (walking minutes) 29.96 (30.50) 28.25 (27.78) 34.17 (35.02)†
Unmet credit need (yes=1; no= 0) 0.03 (0.15) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.17)
Years living in village 37.21 (13.99) 36.55 (14.51) 37.78 (13.24)
Cooperation membership (yes= 1; no=0) 22.55 (0.401) 23.67 (0.412) 23.34 (0.404)
Total land holding (ha) 2.10 (0.97) 2.13 (1.17) 2.37 (1.46)**, †
Total maize area (ha) 0.55 (0.54) 0.69 (0.64)** 1.09 (0.99)**, ††
Avg. maize plot area (ha) 0.37 (0.38) 0.45 (0.41)** 0.37 (0.28)††
Maize yield (kg/ha) 2170 (1,483) 3479 (2,176)** 2753 (1,380)**, ††
Cash-renter proportion (%) 4.62 5.76 7.69
Sharecropper proportion (%) 12.75 20.78 23.81
a Standard deviations are in parentheses.* and ** indicate the variable mean differs from that of non-adopters at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. † and †† indicate the variable mean
differs from that of adopters at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
b Non-adopters are those who did not grow any improved maize variety in the survey period; full adopters are those who purely grew improved maize varieties; and partial adopters are
those who simultaneously grew both improved and local varieties on different plots.
c Computed as the sum of reported current values of all itemized assets in Ethiopian Birrs (ETB). Daily average exchange rate in 2010 is 1 USD=14.38 ETB.
Table 2
Plot Summary Statistics by Tenure Type.a
Owned (n=1965) Cash-rented (n= 89) Sharecropped (n= 305)
Plot size (ha) 0.39 (0.39) 0.41 (0.32) 0.49 (0.41)**
Soil fertility (fertile= 1; otherwise= 0) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.29) 0.20 (0.40)**, †
Soil slope (flat= 1; otherwise= 0) 0.67 (0.47) 0.63 (0.49) 0.67 (0.47)
Soil depth (deep= 1; otherwise= 0) 0.41 (0.49) 0.42 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49)
Distance from home (minute) 9.38 (16.96) 23.38 (31.29)** 24.28 (46.07)**
Cropping season (long= 1; short= 0) 0.93 (0.26) 0.97 (0.18) 0.91 (0.29)
Total household land holding (ha) 2.28 (1.42) 2.19 (1.16) 2.25 (1.40)
Total household asset (ETB)b 19,580 (43,564) 25,846 (79,201) 19,882 (67,475)
Maize yield (kg/ha) 2751 (2,024) 2614 (1,694) 2960 (2,029)
Adopting area proportion (%)c 38.34 41.79 55.93
a Standard deviations are in parentheses. * and ** indicate the variable mean differs from that of owned plots at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. † and †† indicate the variable mean
differs from that of cash-rented plots at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
b Computed as the sum of reported current values of all itemized assets in Ethiopian Birrs (ETB). Daily average exchange rate in 2010 is 1 USD=14.38 ETB.
c Sampling weights are accounted for.
6 This measure is constructed using two survey questions: 1) whether a household had
credit need in crop production in the surveyed year, and 2) whether such need was
eventually met. Some farmers might not need credit, while some others in need of credit
might have successfully secured it. Hence, this measure suggests whether access to credit
was a “real” constraint in maize production during the surveyed period.
D. Zeng et al. Land Use Policy 72 (2018) 270–279
274
adoption is our main interest (Angrist, 2001). Although a nonlinear
model may fit the conditional expectation function better for limited
dependent variable models, the difference in terms of marginal effects is
usually indistinguishable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). A multivariate
probit model with maximum likelihood estimation is an alternative,
where the determinants of multiple correlated binary outcomes are
jointly estimated. However, the multivariate probit model is more re-
strictive than the linear probability model as it relies on the assumption
of joint normality of error terms that is usually violated. Moreover, it is
vulnerable to incorrect first-stage specifications, but the 2SLS estima-
tion of a linear probability model is robust against such misspecification
(Angrist, 2001; Lewbel et al., 2012). Unlike either of these procedures,
the control function probit model with two-stage estimation is designed
for continuous endogenous variables (Rivers and Vuong, 1988), and our
binary endogenous regressors would violate the distributional as-
sumption of this approach. Therefore, we choose the linear probability
model as our main estimation strategy, while we also estimate multi-
variate probit models, namely a trivariate probit contract model with
three binary choices (adoption, cash-rental decision, sharecropping
decision) and a bivariate probit tenure model with two binary choices
(adoption, land rental decision), for comparison purposes.
Successful identification of our empirical models requires the
availability of appropriate instruments, which should be correlated
with land rental decision but not maize variety choice other than
through land rental decision. Two instruments are included in our
analysis: 1) the change of total land holding in the last five years, and 2)
for each household, the proportion of smaller holders in the village who
rented-in land during the study period. Both instruments are worth
careful discussion regarding their validity.
The first instrument is computed as the acreage difference between
household-level land holdings of the current period compared to that of
five years ago. As land sales market is nonexistent in Ethiopia (Holden
et al., 2008), change of land holdings mostly occurs through govern-
mental land redistribution that is exogenous to the household
(Deininger and Jin, 2006), except for land transfers through inheritance
which should be rare in the short run. We posit that recent loss of land
encourages land rental for a tenant, while recent gain of land dis-
courages it. However, such change is unlikely to affect maize variety
choices directly. Moreover, sufficient variation exists as 17.4% house-
holds (226 out of 1300) observed changes in land holdings.
The second instrument reflects the thickness of village land rental
market. Based on within-village ranking of household land holdings,
the proportion of households who own a smaller acreage of land as
compared to each household is constructed.7 The renter proportion
over smaller holders rather than of the whole village is employed given
the notion that the smallness of land holding could stimulate land rental
market participation to meet household food demand, and the instru-
mental variable construction in this way also allows within-village
variation of the instrument among households. It is speculated that the
village land rental markets are thicker and associated transaction costs
are lower if more farmers rent in land. Hence, this instrument should
directly affect land rental decision but not improved maize variety
adoption. In fact, it is recently found that poorer and smaller holders
may as likely adopt improved maize varieties as richer and larger
holders in Ethiopia (Zeng et al., 2015). This leaves only one potential
source of bias: the correlation between the position of a household in
the within-village land holding ranking that may systematically affect
the variation of the instrument and unobservable characteristics that
may affect improved maize variety adoption, which we view as highly
unlikely.8 Therefore, the exclusion restriction should again be satisfied.
6. Results
The contract model is first estimated. Results are presented in
Table 3. Of our main interest is the linear probability model estimated
via 2SLS, which appears to be appropriately identified according to test
statistics. Moreover, the significant error correlation in the bivariate
probit model suggests the simultaneity of improved maize variety
adoption and land rental decisions. Therefore, it makes sense to draw
inference based on the 2SLS estimates while using the bivariate probit
results for robustness check purposes. We also estimate simple linear
probability model and probit model without instrumentation in search
of the sign of selection. Finally, standard errors in linear probability
models are clustered at the district level, the primary sampling unit.
Sharecropping contracts significantly increases the probability of
improved maize variety adoption by 0.142 among sharecroppers. Such
change is very close to, though slightly smaller than, the trivariate-
probit marginal effect of 0.159. On the other hand, the impact among
cash-renters are much smaller and statistically insignificant, which is
intuitive and accords with Hypothesis 1 above. As a comparison, the
impact magnitudes estimated by both OLS and simple probit procedures
are much larger and even significant for cash-renters, suggesting the
existence of positive selection. In other words, farmers may in-
tentionally rent in land to cultivate improved maize varieties. For
sharecroppers, this is intuitive as maize plots under sharecropping
contracts are more fertile and larger than owned ones (see Table 2), and
it can be reasonably speculated that sharecroppers may realize both
productivity and the economy of scale at higher levels.
Among the covariates, larger plots, deeper soil and better education
of the household head are positively associated with adoption, while
older age and longer distance from the nearest main market are nega-
tively associated with adoption. Farmers tend to adopt improved maize
varieties in the long rainy season (meher) rather than the short season
(belg), which is a common practice as the time span of the long rainy
season (from mid-June to mid-September) better meets the water needs
of most maize varieties, and higher maize yields are usually reached in
the former. Most of these effects, however, are relatively small.
Given the estimates above, the overall impact of land rental on
improved maize variety adoption can be positive if it is sufficiently
driven by the impact of sharecropped plots that consist of 77.41% of all
rented plots. Therefore, we further estimate such overall impact in the
tenure model with a single binary land rental indicator rather than
separate dummies for cash-rental and sharecropping. Results are pre-
sented in Table 4. Land rental increases the probability of improved
variety adoption on that plot by 0.135, which is highly significant. The
bivariate probit model suggests a similar impact of 0.151. Moreover, as
in the contract model, the impact magnitudes using OLS and simple
probit procedures are much larger than those with instrumentation,
again suggesting positive selection. Covariate coefficients in the tenure
model bear similar patterns to those in the contract model. Likewise,
few such effects compare in magnitudes to that of the land rental in-
dicator.
These results provide consistent and fairly strong evidence for our
main hypotheses in Hypotheses 1 and 2: land rental does not affect crop
variety adoption decisions of cash-renters but encourages it for
7 To further illustrate our instrumental variable construction, consider a village where
12 households were randomly surveyed. For a household whose total land holding ranked
4th over these 12 households and who observed 3 renters (either cash-renter or share-
cropper) among the 8 smaller holders, the instrument takes the value of 3/8=0.375.
8 The validity of this instrument would be threatened, for example, if more capable
farmers (with higher ability, more experience, etc., which could affect improved maize
variety adoption) would be able to expand his/her land holding over time (which
therefore would change his/her within-village land holding ranking). However, as land
sales market is absent in Ethiopia where the only sources of acreage change are the rare
events of governmental land redistribution and land inheritance, such concern should be
minimized. Therefore, the validity of both instruments rely critically on the plausible
exogeneity of land holding change, a special feature of the Ethiopian land market.
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sharecroppers. Moreover, a positive overall impact is found as the
majority of rented plots were operated under sharecropped contracts.
The impact magnitudes of land rental are larger than most covariate
coefficients, suggesting the substantial explanatory power of this factor
in crop variety adoption decision. Therefore, it is towards the robust-
ness of these impact estimates that we now turn.
We implement several robustness check procedures in addition to
the multivariate probit model estimation. The first two procedures
address model specification issues. First, it is arguable that village-level
unobservable heterogeneity may possibly exist, which could arise from
local land rental market conditions, distinctive agroecological en-
vironments, different agricultural production practices, or varying so-
cial norms across localities. To check if this possibility threatens our
main results, we control for village fixed effects and re-estimate all
models. As seen from the first panel of Table 5, these new estimates are
very close to our main estimates in all specifications.
The second procedure regards production risks that could affect
improved maize variety adoption. One limitation of our cross-sectional
data is the lack of ex ante yield statistics (existent before the cropping
season) that could factor into crop variety choice made at the beginning
of that season. Still, there is a need to detect any potential effect from
production uncertainty, which could confound the impacts of land
rental that is of our primary interest. This is more likely the case for
sharecroppers who, unlike cash-renters, do not individually bare pro-
duction risks. To test this, we have to refer to the ex post yield statistics
at the district level and assume that the yield distribution realized after
the surveyed season is representative of the real yield variations. This is
a reasonable assumption as 2009–2010 was a fairly good cropping year
according to climate statistics we obtained from the National
Meteorology Agency of Ethiopia. Specifically, we consider the first two
moments of yield, the mean and variance, both computed at the district
level using plot-level measures. Impact estimates with these additional
covariates are reported in the second panel of Table 5, which tend to be
slightly smaller yet in no cases do they lose statistical significance. Since
our inference is mainly qualitative, this again supports our main results.
We further implement two subsample analysis to test our main re-
sults. One concern may arise from cropping season. If land rental
market conditions vary systematically with cropping season, partici-
pation in this market would be affected and our impact estimates could
be inconsistent. This, however, is unlikely to be the case as Ethiopian
farmers mainly cultivate maize in the long rainy season for reasons
discussed above. As a result, only 172 of 2359 plots were cultivated in
the short rainy season in our data, and related variation is rather lim-
ited. Nevertheless, we re-estimate all specifications with a homogenized
subsample that only includes 2187 plots cultivated in the long rainy
season to check if our main impact estimates are robust. As reported in
the third panel of Table 5, the new estimates are slightly larger than our
main results, suggesting that the latter are rather conservative. There-
fore, this concern should be minimized.
As a final robustness check, we make use of a unique subsample of
our survey data: 743 maize plots cultivated by 273 partial-adopters who
grew both improved and local maize varieties on different plots in the
surveyed period. Specifically, we consider a first-difference type model
where the plot-level maize variety adoption decision is first demeaned
within the household, and then regressed against both demeaned plot
characteristics and demeaned land rental indicator(s). Household
characteristics would drop out as there is no within-household varia-
tion. The model as linearized from Eq. (8) can be expressed as:
Table 3
Impact Estimates of Contract Model (n= 2359).a
Linear probability models Maximum likelihood proceduresb
OLS 2SLS Probit Trivariate probit
Cash-rental 0.115 (0.054) * 0.069 (0.055) 0.107 (0.048) * 0.084 (0.055)
Sharecropping 0.304 (0.037) ** 0.142 (0.031) ** 0.344 (0.046) ** 0.159 (0.033) **
Plot size 0.039 (0.008) ** 0.051 (0.015) ** 0.041 (0.011) ** 0.038 (0.007) **
Soil fertility −0.041 (0.028) −0.028 (0.023) −0.032 (0.027) −0.019 (0.034)
Soil slope 0.032 (0.027) 0.032 (0.022) 0.027 (0.019) 0.040 (0.026)
Soil depth 0.069 (0.022) ** 0.074 (0.020) ** 0.063 (0.022) ** 0.066 (0.021) **
Dist. from home 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) ** 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) *
Cropping season 0.127 (0.035) ** 0.145 (0.038) ** 0.131 (0.042) ** 0.119 (0.042) **
Household size 0.007 (0.005) 0.006 (0.006) 0.008 (0.005) 0.006 (0.005)
Total asset −0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000)
Head age −0.002 (0.001) −0.002 (0.001) * −0.002 (0.001) −0.003 (0.001) **
Head gender 0.051 (0.056) 0.065 (0.048) 0.052 (0.073) 0.074 (0.074)
Head marital status 0.036 (0.064) 0.044 (0.062) 0.066 (0.068) 0.051 (0.067)
Head education 0.001 (0.005) 0.003 (0.001) * 0.001 (0.004) 0.004 (0.002) *
Main market dist. −0.002 (0.000) ** −0.002 (0.000) ** −0.002 (0.000) ** −0.002 (0.000) **
Extension office dist. 0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.000) −0.001 (0.000) −0.001 (0.000)
Total land holding −0.001 (0.000) −0.001 (0.002) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
Unmet credit need −0.009 (0.004) * −0.014 (0.004) ** −0.007 (0.004) * −0.009 (0.003) **
Years living in village 0.007 (0.011) 0.004 (0.011) 0.014 (0.015) 0.004 (0.014)
Cooperation membership 0.022 (0.012) 0.017 (0.043) 0.023 (0.016) 0.012 (0.020)
Constant 0.192 (0.167) 0.112 (0.173)
F statistic 16.11 ** 22.79 **
F test of 1st stage IV 47.41 **
Underidentificationc 36.88 **
Weak identificationd 27.26
LR / Wald chi-square 293.05 ** 361.44 **
ρadoption and cash-rental 0.198 **
ρadoption and sharecropping 0.345 **
ρ cash-rental and sharecropping 0.127 *
a Dependent variable is the binary improved maize variety adoption indicator. Standard deviations are in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
b Marginal impacts are reported.
c Kleibergen-Paap rank Lagrange Multiplier statistic is reported.
d Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic is reported.
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Eq. (9) cancels out both observed and unobserved household-level
heterogeneity. With further control for plot-level heterogeneity, the
impact of land rental is captured by the estimate of β2, which can be
unbiasedly and consistently recovered through OLS estimation. As
shown in the bottom panel of Table 5, the impact estimates for both
cash-rented and sharecropped plots appear to be much larger than the
full-sample 2SLS results. This provides strong evidence for the observed
positive selection that farmers intentionally rent in plots to cultivate
improved maize varieties. All these results suggest the robustness of our
main impact estimates.
Table 4
Coefficient Estimates of Tenure Model (n= 2359).a
Linear probability models Maximum likelihood proceduresb
OLS 2SLS Probit Bivariate probit
Land rental 0.365 (0.142) ** 0.135 (0.033) ** 0.277 (0.063) ** 0.151 (0.038) **
Plot size 0.033 (0.007) ** 0.040 (0.011) ** 0.044 (0.014) ** 0.044 (0.009) **
Soil fertility −0.037 (0.039) −0.016 (0.023) −0.012 (0.030) −0.021 (0.041)
Soil slope 0.039 (0.020) * 0.033 (0.021) 0.030 (0.025) 0.015 (0.025)
Soil depth 0.067 (0.019) ** 0.060 (0.017) ** 0.079 (0.020) ** 0.073 (0.022) **
Dist. from home 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)
Cropping season 0.122 (0.036) ** 0.141 (0.042) ** 0.154 (0.051) ** 0.136 (0.039) **
Household size 0.012 (0.008) 0.006 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004)
Total asset −0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Head age −0.001 (0.001) −0.002 (0.001) −0.002 (0.001) ** −0.002 (0.001)
Head gender 0.062 (0.055) 0.033 (0.057) 0.075 (0.066) 0.096 (0.062)
Head marital status 0.041 (0.061) 0.050 (0.072) 0.070 (0.041) 0.050 (0.034)
Head education 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002) * 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002) *
Main market dist. −0.002 (0.000) ** −0.002 (0.000) ** −0.002 (0.000) ** −0.002 (0.000) **
Extension office dist. 0.000 (0.000) −0.001 (0.000) −0.001 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000)
Total land holding −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
Unmet credit need −0.019 (0.003) ** −0.014 (0.003) ** −0.008 (0.003) * −0.009 (0.001) **
Years living in village 0.008 (0.005) 0.005 (0.014) 0.013 (0.020) 0.004 (0.014)
Cooperation membership 0.012 (0.015) 0.012 (0.042) 0.021 (0.018) 0.003 (0.022)
Constant 0.127 (0.148) 0.189 (0.095) **
F statistic 16.81 ** 16.33 **
F test of 1st stage IV 79.19 **
Underidentificationc 64.95 **
Weak identificationd 54.11
LR / Wald chi-square 286.26 ** 536.60 **
ρadoption and land rental 0.213 **
a Dependent variable is the binary improved maize variety adoption indicator. Standard deviations are in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
b Marginal effects are reported.
c Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic is reported.
d Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic is reported.
Table 5
Impact Estimates via Robustness Check Procedures.a
Linear probability models Multivariate probitb
Contract model Tenure model Contract model Tenure model
Instrumental variable estimation with village fixed effects (n= 2359)
Cash-rental 0.068 (0.045) 0.062 (0.033)
Sharecropping 0.139 (0.047) ** 0.160 (0.054) **
Land ownership 0.121 (0.028) ** 0.137 (0.059) *
Instrumental variable estimation with yield risk measures (n= 2359)
Cash-rental 0.071 (0.052) 0.069 (0.054)
Sharecropping 0.097 (0.035) ** 0.134 (0.042) **
Land ownership 0.115 (0.039) ** 0.122 (0.036) **
Instrumental variable estimation using long-season subsample (n= 2187)
Cash-rental 0.081 (0.057) 0.065 (0.046)
Sharecropping 0.164 (0.030) ** 0.185 (0.033) **
Land ownership 0.142 (0.035) ** 0.162 (0.041) **
Ordinary least square estimation using partial-adopter subsample (n= 743)
Cash-rental 0.207 (0.141)
Sharecropping 0.228 (0.065) **
Land ownership 0.205 (0.064) **
a Dependent variable in the upper and central panel models is the binary improved maize variety adoption
indicator, while in the lower panel it is the demeaned adoption indicator. Standard deviations are in par-
entheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
b Marginal effects are reported.
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7. Concluding remarks
We assess the impact of land rental as manifested in two major
contracts on improved crop variety adoption. While many previous
studies hypothesize that the lack of land ownership discourages agri-
cultural technology adoption (Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; Abdulai
et al., 2011; Oostendorp and Zaal, 2012), this is not the case for im-
proved crop varieties. The theoretical model shows that land rental
does not affect crop variety adoption of cash-renters, but encourages
adoption by sharecroppers. Empirical analysis of Ethiopian maize
farmers provides robust evidence in support of these hypotheses. As the
benefits of improved crop varieties are widely documented in literature
and their adoption is widely proposed as a potential means of welfare
improvement in SSA, it is necessary to reevaluate the role of land rental
markets as a means of stimulating improved crop variety adoption,
which makes the current study policy-relevant.
Although our findings contradict many previous results concerning
land tenure and agricultural technology adoption, they are not incon-
sistent with arguments for tenure security in SSA, which has been
shown to be associated with multidimensional welfare improvements
Kassie et al., 2011; Shiferaw et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 2015). In fact,
policy implications would directly arise from the theory of second best,
which justifies governmental intervention in related markets to offset
the efficiency loss in a primary market that observes irremovable dis-
tortion (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). In our context, as land sales
market is not legal in Ethiopia (and incomplete in most SSA countries,
see Holden et al., 2008), improvements in the land rental market in-
stead could substantially reduce the gap between land demand and
supply and improve household welfare through improved crop variety
adoption. It is recently found that land rental markets in Kenya promote
farm productivity and significantly raise the incomes of land-con-
strained farm households (Jin and Jayne, 2013). Therefore, potential
policies that ease transactions in local land rental markets may com-
plement existing strategies to stimulate improved crop variety adop-
tion. For example, agricultural extension services that promote in-
formation exchange in land rental markets, such as a village
information board, may immediately reduce the search costs of both
tenants and landlords. On the other hand, government actions to reduce
policy uncertainty in land rental markets may potentially help for-
malize these markets to allow longer term contractual arrangements
and incentivize farmers to participate. Although our results do not
speak directly to the merits of these strategies, they are still worth
policy consideration as a possible means to improve farm household
welfare in SSA.
A first assessment of the impact land rental on improved crop
variety adoption, our study has several limitations. The cross-sectional
data do not support the investigation of the dynamic impacts associated
with contractual length and/or renewal frequency. Also, limited data
variation regarding other productivity-enhancing technologies, espe-
cially fertilizers, does not allow the modeling of joint adoption deci-
sions. These open questions are worth further investigation with
available data. At the minimum, our partial-equilibrium analysis does
confirm the overall positive impact of land rental on crop variety
adoption. Empirical results imply that improvements of land rental
markets could potentially improve household welfare through partici-
pation in this market and associated profit-maximizing crop choices
given the prominent role of agriculture in small household income
generation in Ethiopia and other SSA economies.
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